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Aldous Huxley's Brave New World presents us with the terrifying
possibilities of what human beings can do to one another when respect for
the basic values of life are compromised. Many of the technologies
envisioned by Huxley, such as in vitro fertilization and the genetic
engineering of children, have proved to be remarkably prescient. What is
especially compelling about Huxley 's Brave New World is the utilitarian
promise of advancing science while ostensibly not harming anyone in the
process. The principal promise consists in the abolishment of all disease
and social conflict, albeit at the price of a moral enervation of the human
psyche and the elimination of introspective religiou ~ sentiments. This
rather heavy price would be too much to bear except for the fact that those
in control do not realize what has been lost. "Unlike the man reduced by
disease or slavery, the people dehumanized a la Brave New World are not
miserable, don't know that they are dehumanized , and, what is worse,
would not care if they knew. They are, indeed, happy slaves with a slavish
happiness." 1
The National Academy of Sciences unveiled a set of research
guidelines that would ease us into the brave new world of human
embryonic stem cell (hESC) biotechnology. The authors of the document
allege that we need to establish responsible oversight practices that will
enhance the integrity of privately funded research with hESCs.
Specifically, these hESC oversight committees would promote research
that allows the destruction of human embryos for the express purpose of
extracting stem cells, the purpose being to develop new regenerative
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technologies such as replacement organs. Apart from the doubts some
authors have expressed about the practical feasibility of creating cloned
organs for transplantation, the means or methods that would be employed
are repugnant to many. In a press release announcing these
recommendations on April 26, 2005 we read that hESC oversight
committees "should review proposals for research that takes stem cells
from excess blastocysts at in vitro fertilization clinics or from blastocysts
created expressly for stem cell research. They also should review any
proposed use of blastocysts created by nuclear transfer, often referred to as
therapeutic cloning."2 Here it should be said that employing somatic
nuclear cell transfer (SNCT) techniques to create new organs is not really
therapeutic cloning, but is the creation of a new organism from which an
organ is harvested (i.e., reproductive cloning).3
The report adds that guidelines should be developed to address "how
far scientists should go in mixing human and animal cells to create socalled chimeras, which researchers may need to do in order to test the
therapeutic potential of human stem cells in animal models. "4 Specific
safeguards would be in place, we are assured, so as to avoid the remote
possibility of two mating chimeric animals giving birth to an offspring
containing a human organ. Besides the philosophical question of whether a
monkey with a human brain is still a monkey, a human being in a monkey
suit, or a tertium quid of some kind, it is hard to avoid concluding that what
it means to be human is unclear to the signatories of the Guidelines. This
should not be too surprising I suppose, since many scientists are apparently
convinced that there is no such thing as human nature. To be more precise,
there are no fixed human characteristics that are naturally linked with being
human, whkh means the special dignity we have traditionally ascribed to
ourselves is merely the accidental by-product of evolptionary history.
Indeed, the Prepublication Copy of the Guidelines states that there are no
fixed species, and the boundaries separating traditional taxonomic
groupings are "to some extent arbitrary."5
While some scientists worry about an irrational blockade of further
funding for hESC research based on religious convictions, Francis
Fukuyama reminds us that neither Aldous Huxley nor C. S. Lewis believed
religion was the only grounds for understanding what it means to be
human. "Both writers suggest that nature itself, and in particular human
nature, has a special role in defining for us what is right and wrong, just
and unjust, important and unimportant."6 In this article I suggest that a
consequentialist version of utilitarian ethical thinking is at work in the
current debate over hES cell research. While this form of reasoning can
explain why a right action is good, it cannot serve as a reliable guide for
making correct ethical decisions, because the proposed good state of affairs
allows the use of any means to attain the desired end.
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I. Specific Features of the National Academies' Recommendations
In what follows I implicitly defend the moral principle that it is never
right to deliberately take the life of an innocent human being. Pope John
Paul II stressed this very point in Evangelium Vitae , reminding us that the
commandment "You shall not kill" (Ex. 20: 13; Deut. 5: 17) admits of no
exception in the case of innocent human beings. "The deliberate decision
to deprive an innocent human being of his life is always morally evil and
can never be licit either as an end in itself or as a means to a good end."7
Concerning the specific issue at hand here, since we do not know at what
stage of development the human embryo is (or has become) a person, there
is no justification for killing what could in fact be a personal human being.
Chapter Three of the Guidelines for Human Embryonic Stem Cell
Research addresses the primary ethical concerns surrounding the
promotion of this biomedical investigative activity, namely, that the
derivation of hESCs involves the destruction of the blastocyst which "is
regarded by some people as a human being."8 This line of reasoning (or
exposition) is somewhat fallacious, as no scientist proposes to derive
hESCs from anything other than a human being. Bioethicists who deny
that the blastocyst is a human being often appeal to the possibility of
monozygotic twinning prior to implantation, but this claim implies that the
zygote is just an unorganized clump of cells. The very fact we are speaking
about twinning at all presupposes a pre-existing unitary organism, a single
living entity that could possibly split into two genetically identical
individuals.
In the next section of the Guidelines, entitled "The Special Status of
the Human Embryo," the authors offer an exaggeratedly subtle
comparison: "some view human embryos as morally e(Juivalent to born
human persons." At this juncture three possible positions are mentioned in
defense of embryonic personhood: (1) the identity of a future person is
present in the embryo, (2) the moral equivalence of the embryo to a person
is associated with potentiality, and (3) human dignity is undermined by
excessive manipulation of the embryo regardless of purpose. Each one of
these positions is extremely complex, yet there is no discussion of the
myriad philosophical issues associated with them. We are simply told that
current cultural practice should dictate what is right or wrong about
handling the human embryo. This is equivalent to basing moral judgments
on majority rule, a democratic approach to thinking that is completely
absurd in moral matters, since we can only regulate human affairs within
the confines of the true and the good.
Concerning the notion of cultural practice, the document states that
since "the natural loss of an embryo in normal human reproduction is not
recognized as a death that requires a funeral," the embryo must not be a
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human being that is morally equivalent to a newborn person. True, funeral
and burial rites are generally reserved for baptized individuals, for the
unbaptized individual is not a full-fledged member of the Church with
access to her sacraments and liturgy. Nevertheless, funeral services in the
Catholic tradition include special prayers for children who die before
baptism, and these prayers can be used for a stillborn child as well. Several
American bishops have approved of holding funeral services for unborn
children killed by abortion. 9
The Guidelines go on to state that since "the disposal of human
embryos after completion of infertility treatments is not treated as murder
by the legal system," the community does not view these entities as
morally equivalent to human persons. While neither state nor federal law
currently penalizes the disposal of surplus human embryos produced by in
vitro fertilization, this does not necessarily mean that these entities do not
deserve to be treated with the same respect as infants. As a matter of fact,
one could argue that we are dealing with a legal lacuna here, one that will
be addressed within a relatively short period of time. Interestingly enough,
to date, there have been several successfully prosecuted criminal cases for
the murder of a pregnant woman and the young human being in her womb.
Besides the high profile Scott Peterson case in California, in which Lacy
Peterson's husband was convicted on two counts of homicide - the murder
of his wife and the killing of their son Connor, thirty states now include
fetal homicide in their penal codes. Also, President Bush signed The
Unborn Victims of Violence Act on April 1, 2004, a measure that has
withstood constitutional challenges in several states.
The Guidelines also remind us that Islam, Judaism and even some
Protestant denominations do not recognize the human embryo as morally
equivalent to a person until at least 40 days after concl\\ption. And since
many of these same religions have a strong commitment to the idea that
faith must be manifest in good works, the authors conclude that members
of these congregations should support the use of hESCs, even if they believe
the embryo "may have greater moral status than other collections of cells."
This statement is both inaccurate and inconclusive. It is inaccurate because
the human conceptus is an integrated, unified organism with a selfcontained program of development, and it is inconclusive because a moral
judgment cannot be made based on such a conjectural premise.
While the Guidelines rightly affirm that there is a general debate in
society over the meaning of human dignity, the drafters of this document
claim to have reached a balanced solution to this conundrum. Specifically,
they state that "a profound moral obligation" is incumbent upon us to
promote human dignity, working to restore health and natural function to
the sick. While no one would argue with that altruistic aim, at least
considered in the abstract, why are we willing to violate the human dignity
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of one member of Homo sapiens in order to promote the physical welfare
of others? One possibility is to simply deny that humans are unique vis-avis other animals.
[T]he popular notion that there are clear and distinct lines between
species is a notoriously unreliable categorical scheme. Taxonomies
developed since Aristotle do not necessarily countenance the idea of
natural kinds, and modern scientists differ in their precise definitions
of interspecies boundaries. There is general agreement in the
scientific cornrnunity that these boundaries are to some extent
arbitrary. 10

Given the regnant views of human dignity on offer at present, Leon Kass
suggests that the notion of personal dignity is of limited value in bioethics. II
While I would not concede nearly so much, it is quite ironic that one of the
classical distinguishing features of different mammalian species is that
members of distinct natural kinds do not and cannot mate. The specific
difference between humans and other animals is significant, and this
biological boundary reinforces the philosophical notion of natural kinds.

II. Utilitarian Reasoning and Consequentialist Motivation
Of the many ethical theories currently available to us for the decisionmaking process, ethicists generally agree that utilitarian reasoning is
particularly well-suited for problem solving in biomedicine. Utilitarianism
holds that the right course of action to follow in any given situation is the
one that produces the greatest balance of benefits over harms for everyone
concerned, and this consideration implies that the mejns employed to
maximize results are more or less irrelevant. One merely postulates the
desirability of some particular human good or state of affairs and then
identifies the act or acts that will maximize (or optimize) the desired result.
Elizabeth Anscombe introduced the term "consequentialism" to the
discussion of utilitarianism in order to focus attention on the inherent
strategy of maximizing the expected consequences of free choices. 12
The attractiveness of what I will call utilitarian consequentialism
rests with its straightforward, procedural approach to the decision-making
process, with the rightness or wrongness of an action being judged
exclusively by the anticipated consequences, providing apparently singular
and unambiguous public policy determinations. Critics of utilitarian
consequentialism call our attention to several limitations of its calculus of
beneficial results . For instance, it does not take into account important
intention-foresight and acts-omissions distinctions, and these are
absolutely critical for evaluating the moral probity of human action.
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Predictably, rights, obligations, and intentions are not easily included in the
premises of utilitarian arguments. Since a consequentialist calculation of
potential utilitarian benefit only provides an account of what makes a right
act right, it is not a very suitable method for moral decision-making. 13
Simply discussing the pros and cons of potential research protocols
is not a cogent form of reasoning either. Given the fact that utilitarian
consequentialism tends to limit moral judgment to a proportionalist
assessment of the benefits and risks of anticipated outcomes, its
practitioners often experience difficulty in providing satisfactory solutions
to challenging moral questions. With respect to the pros and cons of human
cloning, for instance, Dan Brock states: "there is not an ethically decisive
case either for or against pennitting it or doing it."'4 This inconclusive
response is not as benign as it might sound, for, as Hilary Putnam warns, to
"think of all moral problems in tenns of 'trade-offs' is precisely not to
think morally at all."'5 At the end of the day, as Charles Taylor writes,
"disagreement seems utterly inarbitrable by reason, bridgeable only by
propaganda, arm twisting, or emotional manipulation."' 6 Indeed, the
utilitarian consequentialist tends to pit the good of a specific individual
against the good of society at large, creating an uneasy tension between the
long-range interests of a community and individual rights. We are left with
mere 'traffic rules' for detennining moral values, based almost exclusively
on the perceived usefulness of a particular result, with little or no concern
for moral truth or individual rights. "When dealing with a calculus of
consequences, the inviolability of human dignity no longer exists, because
nothing is good or bad in itself any more."1 7
Numerous scientists and moral philosophers argue that the zygote,
embryo or fetus is not really a person. After all, these life forms are not
conscious, intelligent, free agents of choice. Those scienti6ts usually have a
materialistic, evolutionary and mechanistic view of life, which leads them
to deny that immature human life is worthy of legal protection. So Ronald
Dworkin advocates the genetic engineering of human beings for the greater
good, arguing that we have the responsibility to ensure that each individual
life is useful. And "if playing God means struggling to improve what God
deliberately or nature blindly has evolved over eons, then the first principle
of ethical individualism commands that struggle, and its second principle
forbids, in the absence of positive evidence of danger, hobbling scientists
and doctors who volunteer to lead it."' 8 While Dworkin is not considered to
be a utilitarian, his principal argument, i.e., that the human embryo does
not have a right to life because it is a non-sentient entity with no interests,
is a utilitarian test for determining what can be considered a moral object.
When you consider the fact that many non-sentient entities have legal
interests and a public persona, such as corporations, associations, or
estates, this argument is not very convincing. 19
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Ever since David Hume insisted that we cannot derive moral norms
from factual premises (i.e., deriving 'ought' from 'is'), the naturalistic
fallacy has become common currency in modem thought. Nevertheless,
Hume agreed with Plato and Aristotle that the ' is-ought' dichotomy is
bridged by the goals we set for ourselves, and that the aims of human life
cannot be reduced to simple sensual ends like pleasure.2o While there is a
certain stylistic elegance associated with the reductionist strategy
underlying utilitarian ethical paradigms, this way of reasoning does not
incorporate the complexity of what it means to be human into the decisionmaking process, nor does it consider the moral purpose for which we act.
This is why Joseph Ratzinger stresses that there are many dangers
associated with failing to limit oneself in the application of technological
discoveries. "For it is very evident that everything depends on man 's not
doing everything of which he is capable-for he is capable of destroying
himself and the world-but on knowing that what 'should' be done and
what 'may ' be done are the standard against which to measure what 'can'
be done."21
The consequentialist method of determining utilitarian benefit is
severely hampered by the neutral position it assumes with respect to
theories of the good as well as its disregard for motivation. As Jonathan
Dancy writes: "consequentialism is a theory which gives us certain ends,
but which is officially silent on which patterns of motivation may best
promote those ends ."22 The advocates of hESC research would no doubt
reply that we ought to pursue this activity in order to provide medical
benefits to human beings with severely crippling maladies. This
explanation of the merit of hESC research is not especially compelling
because the ethical method employed presupposes the desired results. That
is to say, utilitarian consequentialism inevitably entails ci£cular reasoning,
accepting the notion that the end justifies the means. Arthur Caplan admits
as much when he says that the task of a bioethicist is to determine what
someone wants to achieve and then providing the values and principles
needed to achieve it. 23 This is in keeping with the utilitarian
consequentialist's focus on hypothetical benefits, which are used to justify
the use of any means to bring about the desired state of affairs. As Timothy
O'Connell asserts, the end-not-means principle "must be rejected if by
'end' one means the consequences of one's act, for it is these consequences
precisely that justify the means."24 What is missing here is an objective
moral norm, principle, or standard by which to judge which options are
truly good to employ as means to the desired end. Any possible actions can
be measured against one another in an ethical sense only if they have some
shared property that can be evaluated by a distinct moral norm.25
The tragic death of 18-year-old Jesse Gelsinger sheds some light on
the pitfalls of utilitarian consequentialist decision-making, especially with
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respect to the motivation of those who take part in biomedical research.
The researchers in this case failed to inform the patient that an
experimental adenovirus gene therapy designed to correct a serious liver
ailment had caused several deaths in experiments with monkeys. An
important feature of the case was the motivation of the head investigator,
Dr. James M. Wilson, who admitted that factors other than the patient's
medical welfare influenced his decision to pursue this high-risk research
protocol. "Publishing in first-rate journals. That's what turns us on. You ' ve
got to be on the cutting edge and take risks if you ' re going to stay on top."26
Besides the blinding effects of unbridled self-interest, utilitarian
reasoning fails to take into account considerations of justice. In the case of
hESC research, what warrants the taking of the life of an immature human
being, in order to pursue a hypothetical gain for mature human beings? The
only plausible answer is that the adult human being is judged to be more
valuable to society than the immature one is, an argument that sounds a lot
like John Rawls ' moral theory of justice. Comparing normative moral
theory to the scientific method, in which new data calls for constant
modifications of theory, Rawls contends that justice is not a universal,
constant, objective truth but represents an ever-changing theory that strives
for reflective moral equilibriumY This purely subjective concept offers us
no way to bridge the epistemological divide separating diverse theories of
justice. One set of considered moral judgments is simply pitted against
another, with little prospect of reaching a satisfactory resolution to
conflicting theOlies of justice. 28
Paradoxically, besides insisting that community justice is not defined
in terms of desired consequences, Rawl's theory could be employed to call
into question hESC research. Rawls proposes imagining oneself in an
original position of veiled ignorance, with your task as moral trustee being
to promote the self-interested good of your principal. Applying this idea to
the issue at hand, if a person were to imagine that she was once an embryo,
and that others might have had the power to interrupt her nascent life, she
would probably veto any action that is not respectful of the individuality of
others and work to provide legal sanctions to prevent the killing of all
embryonic life.
An intriguing development in this story is the fact that a motion filed
by a pro-life advocacy group in California, the Life Legal Defense
Foundation, could give rise to considerable delay in the issuance of state
bonds to fund the $3 billion hESC research initiative in that state. This
legal challenge does not address the so-called "clone-and-kill" procedures
contemplated by the California Institute for Regenerative Medicine, but
focuses on the legality of disbursing state funds without any oversight by
elected officials. Moreover, in · answer to a query concerning the impact
hESC research might have on job creation in the Bay Area, Nobel laureate
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1. Michael Bishop, the Chancellor of the University of California-San

Francisco, replied: "We haven ' t figured out how to make stem cells do
what we need them to do to be useful clinically. Until that is done, it's a
pretty shaky base for startups."29

Conclusion
I have outlined some of the more salient ethical problems associated
with the utilitarian mindset that underlies the current thinking on the
advisability of hESC research. We are on the verge of entering into a brave
new world of wholesale destruction of human embryos, a public policy that
would expand the possibilities of dehumanizing ourselves to a degree that
is hard to imagine. Perhaps we should not be too surprised by this
development. In keeping with the regnant notion that the human race is not
a fixed species but just a more advanced form of primate, the very concept
of human nature has been called into question as well as the special dignity
of humans . Ultimately, recourse to utilitarian consequentialist reasoning to
formulate public policy on hESC research is invalid, because this
methodology only provides an account of what makes a right action right
and not what is good or bad in itself. Like it or not, a human being is a
human being, independent of its active capacity for rational, volitional and
relational activity. Instructively, Theodor Haecker once remarked that
Satan attempts to rob beauty of its transparency, moving us to be more
fascinated by the captivating interest of an idea than the splendor of
objective truth. 30 Let us hope the truth about the human embryo will soon
prevail in the public forum in general and in the biomedical research arena
in particular.

References
1. Leon Kass, Toward a More Natural Science: Biology and Human Affairs (New
York: Free Press, 1985), p. 35.
2. Cf. E. Christian Brugger, "Human Cloning, Theology of the Body And the
Humanity of the Embryo," The Linacre Quarterly 71 (2004): 232-244, especially 234.
The terminological distinction between reproductive and therapeutic cloning is a
semantic ruse, as every instance of human cloning is a true reproductive act. That is to
say, the intended purpose of this research is to produce a new human being with
human embryonic stem cells. After all, the specific aim of these studies is to assess the
regenerative possibilities of totipotent hESCs.

November, 2005

327

3. When researchers at Advanced Cell Technology claimed to have used cloned ESCs
from a cow to create a nascent kidney, they actually implanted the clone blastocyst
into a cow's uterus, allowed the blastocyst to gestate for several weeks until the fetus
formed a kidney, and then harvested the new kidney for transplantation. So, rather
being than an example of therapeutic cloning, a cloned fetus was killed in order to
harvest a nascent organ for transplantation. See Robert P. Lanza, Ho Yun Chung,
James J. Yoo, Peter J. Wettstein, Catherine Blackwell, Nancy Borson, Erik Hofmeister,
Gunter Schuch, Shay Soker, Carlos T. Moraes, Michael D. West & Anthony Atala,
"Generation of Histocompatible Tissue Using Nuclear Transplantation," Nature
Biotechnology 20 (2002) : 689-696.
4. The National Academies, "Guidelines Released for Embryonic Stem Cell
Research," at http://www.nationalacademies.org (emphasis added). The Guidelines
also suggest that grafted pig porcine heart val ves represent an instance of a porcinehuman chimera, whereas a true chimera is an entire organism composed of two
genetically distinct types of cells resulting from the fusion of two early blastula stage
embryos. The more likely scenario here entails recourse to SNCT, in which the DNA
of a human somatic cell is transferred to an animal oocyte, with the distinct possibility
that animal mitochondrial DNA could enter the cloned genome, certainly an
unintended consequence.
5. National Research Council and the Institute of Medicine of the National
Academies, Prepublication Copy of Guidelines for Human Embryonic Stem Cell
Research (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2005), p. 41. This is
available at http://www.nap.edu.This is a good example of the myth of romantic
humanism, which puts faith in technological progress to solve human problems and
leads to the desire for control over human nature. That this represents a kind of
religion is evidenced by the fact that scientists seem to envision themselves as
Promethean creators endowed with the capacity to surpass ever.: natural or cultural
limitation in order to move us into an open future. See Benedict M. Ashley, Choosing
A World-VIew and Value -System: An Ecumenical Apologetics (New York: Alba House,
1999), pp. 50-51.
6. Francis Fukuyama, Our Posthuman Future (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux,
2002), p. 7.
7. John Paul II, The Gospel of Life [Evangelium Vitae] (New York: Times Books,
1995), Chapter III, no. 57.5, p. 102.
8. Guidelines for Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research (Washington, DC: The
National Academies Press, 2005), p. 39 (emphasis added).
9. See a questions and answers forum with Cardinal John O' Connor that addresses this
question at http://www.priestsforlife.org/magisteriumlcardocqanda.html#qal4 .

328

Linacre Quarterly

10. Guidelines for Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research (Washington, DC: The
National Academies Press, 2005), p. 41 .
II. Leon Kass, Life, Liberty and the Defense of Dignity: Th e Challenge for Bioethics
(San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2002), p. 17.
12. See G. E. M . Anscombe, "Modern Moral Philosophy," Philosophy 33 (1958): 1.
13. See Raymond G. Frey, "Act-Utilitarianism," in H. LaFollette (ed.), The Blackwell
Guide to Ethical Theory (Malden : Blackwell, 2000), p. 174; David Sobel, "Subjective
Accounts of Reasons for Action," Ethics III (2002): 461-492.
14. From Dan W. Brock, "Cloning Human Beings: An Assessment of the Ethical
Issues Pro and Con," in M. C. Nussbaum, C. R. Sunstein (eds.), Clones and Clones:
Facts and Fantasies about Human Cloning (New York: and London: W. W. Norton,
1998), pp. 141-164.
15. Hilary Putnam, "Taking Rules Seriously," in J. Conant (ed.), Realism with a
Human Face (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), pp. 161-162
16. Charles Taylor, "Lichtung or Lebensform: Parallels between Heidegger and
Wittgenstein," in Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge/Harvard: Harvard University
Press, 1995), pp. 39-40.
17. Joseph Ratzinger, "Introduction to Christianity: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow,"
Communio 31 (2004): 481-495 ; citation at p. 493.
18. Ronald M. Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 452
19. Ronald M. Dworkin, Life s Dominion: An Argument about Abortion, Euthanasia,
and Individual Freedom (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), pp. 15-18.
20. See Alasdair Maclntyre, "Hume on ' Is' and ' Ought' ," Philosophical Review 68
(1959): 451-468.
21. Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, Salt of the Earth: Christianity and the Catholic Church
at the End of the Millennium (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1997), p. 230.
22. Jonathan Dancy, Moral Reasons (Oxford/Cambridge: Blackwell, 1993), p. 237 .
23. See Andrew Costello, "The Thinker," Philadelphia (March 1994): 74-83.
24. Timothy E. O' Connell, Principles for a Catholic Morality (New York: Seabury,
1978), p. 172.
November, 2005

329

25. Cf. Patrick Lee, Abortion and Unborn Human Life (Washington, DC: The
Catholic University of America Press, 1996), p. 140.
26. Rick Weiss and Deborah Nelson, "Teen Dies Undergoing Experimental Gene
Therapy," The Washington Post, September 29, 1999, A I.
27. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press/Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1972), pp. 46-51.
28. R. M. Hare, "Rawl 's Theory of Justice - I," Philosophical Quarterly 23 (1973):
144-147.
29. Taken from the National Catholic Register 81 (May 22-28, 2005) : 10.
30. Theodor Haecker, SchOnheit: Ein Versuch (Leipzig: Hegner, 1936), p. 91; cf. John
Saward, The Beauty of Holiness and the Holiness of Beauty: Art, Sanctity and the
Truth of Catholicism (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1997), pp. 32-37.

330

Linacre Quarterly

